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The retention of naval officers is often assumed to be in-
dependent of the economic circumstances of the individual. This
study makes use of classical, normal linear least squares regres-
sion techniques and recent surface warfare officer retention data
in an attempt to determine whether the retention of lieutenants
can be related to a set of economic control variables. In the
pursuit of that goal, several previously-developed econometric
models which describe first-term enlisted retention are modified
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The Defense Manpower Commission in its April, 1976, Report
to the President [l] states:
There is something to military service beyond pay and
benefits; one serves regardless of recognition or ap-
preciation. If this were not so, the professional
armed forces of the Western democracies would not have
survived the period between the wars. In short, true
professionals will serve and fight, even if they believe
they are being neglected.
This view, while popular and widely held, does not consider the
serviceman to exhibit rational economic behavior. However,
consider the April, 1978, Report of the President's Commission
on Military Compensation [2]:
Since the switch to a volunteer force in 1973, the
Nation's supply of military manpower has become more
dependent on the conditions of the labor marketplace...
To attract and retain personnel, changes in compensation
policies and personnel management practices became
necessary to enable the services to compete effectively
with private and other employers.
This second view implies that compensation is a key factor in
the retention of military personnel, i.e., the serviceman's
decision to select a military career over some other field of
endeavor is at least partly based on the economic consequences
of such a decision.
This study assumes the position of the second commission;
precisely, it is assumed that, when faced with a decision
Chartered by Public Law 93-155 (Title VII of the DOD
Appropriations Act of 1974)
.

regarding leaving the naval service, each naval officer will
compare the present values of all future compensation from the
two possible courses of action and select the option with the
greater present value. That is not to say that monetary com-
pensation alone is important; certainly, the intangible rewards
of military service are also factors in any decision regarding
a military career. Yet, the officer must, either consciously
or subconsciously, place a monetary value on those intangibles
in order to compare the relative values of the two options
.
A number of studies, notably [3] and [4], have attempted to
describe the factors which affect entrance to and retention in
the enlisted community. Moreover, [4] sought with some degree
of success to determine the rate of change in retention with
respect to military compensation, i.e., to estimate the elasticity
of first-term reenlistment rate with respect to military wage.
No known study has sought to determine similar elasticities for
naval officers who are faced with similar choices regarding a
naval career. This study will attempt to establish a functional
relationship between naval surface warfare officer retention and
a set of economic control variables and use that relationship to
determine the elasticity of retention with respect to compensation.
10

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Since FY68, a formatted data bank concerning various naval
officer communities has been maintained by OP130, the Officer
Plans Section of OPNAV. This bank serves as the source data
for officer manpower models used by OP130 to estimate officer
strengths by rank, years of service and community. One version
of the data extracted from the bank, the so-called "Career
Planning Board Version" for surface warfare officers, has been
2
supplied by OP130C4 for use in this study.
The Career Planning Board Version is subdivided into two
sections: one lists attritions by rank, years of service and
attrition category for FY69-78; the other lists attritions by
years of service and attrition category for the same period.
This study will use the data of the second section.
Appendix A is a partial reproduction of the pertinent data
extracted from the second section of the report. Note that
each page in Appendix A refers to surface warfare officers
with a given number of years of service (YS = i, i = 2,.. .,8).
Each page lists seven attrition categories:
1. Retirement
2. Release from Active Duty (RAD)
3. Resignation
2 . .This version includes only "due course officers," i.e.,
officers who have not failed selection to the next higher grade.
3That portion of the data set which is not pertinent to this








Opposite the attrition category, the number of officers who
were lost via that category is listed for each fiscal year,
1969-1978. The first three rows of entries (BASES) gives the
number of surface warfare officers with YS = i who began each
fiscal year according to whether the officers were USN (REG)
or USNR (RES) or either (TOTAL) . In addition to the attrition
data, Appendix B presents a summary table of surface warfare
community accessions by fiscal year and years of service.
12

II. THEORY UNDERLYING THE RETENTION MODEL
A. PRELIMINARY
The goal of this study is to determine whether there exists
a functional relationship between retention rates and a set of
economic control variables. Toward this end an analysis of
the economic situation faced by the naval officer is presented.
B. TASTE AND OPPORTUNITY FACTORS
Consider an officer who has completed his initial obligated
service or is approaching that point. The variables which
affect his decision to continue to serve or to leave the naval
service may be grouped into two broad categories; pecuniary
and non-pecuniary. Within the first category are all factors
which reflect monetary (opportunity) considerations. It
includes such variables as military pay, alternative civilian
pay, and other factors which may be expressed equivalently in
monetary terms. The second category would include such non-
pecuniary (taste) factors as job satisfaction, adaptability
to military life, attitudes toward sea duty, and other factors
which are difficult to quantify.
In order to make a rational decision in an economic sense,
each individual naval officer requires some estimate of the
present value of all future compensation from the two 'courses
of action available to him. Let PVM be the present value of
13

all future earnings realized from a military career and PVC
be the present value of all future earnings from an alternative
civilian career.
PVM is composed of two types of returns, direct payments
such as basic pay and allowances and payments in kind such as
medical care and officers club privileges. Within each year
group of each specialized officer community, one can assume
that PVM for officer A is approximately the same as that for
officer B, provided A and B view their prospects for advance-
4
ment to be the same. Furthermore, since direct military pay
is structured according to rank and longevity, a given officer
may roughly estimate PVM by speculating on his ultimate pay
grade and intended length of service and adding some percentage
of direct compensation to cover indirect compensation. Esti-
mating PVC is considerably more difficult.
Among other factors, PVC depends on civilian occupation,
education, opportunity for advanced education, labor market
stability, and geographical area of employment. Thus, PVC for
officer A may bear little relation to PVC for officer B due to
a considerable difference in civilian "qualifications" of the
two officers. However, if one is willing to make the assump-
tion that the overall educational background and civilian
qualifications in a given officer community does not change
significantly from one year group to the next (i.e., year
group X contains the same proportion of engineers, business
4 It can be argued that such an assumption also depends on
the relative importance A and B place on payments in kind. The




graduates, USNA graduates as year group Y) , a method of esti-
mating PVC for a "typical" officer might be developed. However,
before beginning that development, the relative importance of
the non-pecuniary factors will be examined.
In 1974, the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory published
a study on the attractiveness of various non-monetary benefits [2],
Table I is a rank ordering of factors identified as most important
in deciding to remain in the Air Force, by the respondent's length
of service. For the purposes of this study it is assumed that
the results of Table I are equally applicable to naval officers.
TABLE I
Factors Affecting Air Force Retention
Factor Years of Service
0-2.5 2.5-•4 4-7 7-13 13+
Job Satisfaction 1 2 1 2 2
Personal Freedom 2 1 3 7* 8*





Care 5 6 5 4 3
Pay Plus Benefits 6 7 8 6 7
Advancement
Opportunity 7 6 4 7* 6
Security 8 4 7 5 4




Note that the three most important factors for the 0-2.5, 2.5-4,
and 4-7 years of service groups are job satisfacton, personal
freedom and cash. Of particular significance is the fact that
in the 4-7 years of service group, the group in which the
decision regarding career intentions is first faced, cash
payment is rated higher (2) than at any other point in an
officer's career. The fact that job satisfaction is never
ranked lower than second indicates that the issue of job satis-
faction is probably moot (if the Air Force did not provide job
satisfaction, those who ranked it second in later years would
probably have left much earlier). Moreover, of the five
highest ranked factors in the 4-7 years of service category,
probably only one (cash) showed much variation over the 1969-
1978 time frame, the period of interest in this study. Conse-
quently, given that a set of taste or personal preference varia-
bles affect retention rate, one would expect that for each year
group in question the overall effect of those preferences was
essentially constant. Therefore, the problem of quantifying
the taste factors can be eliminated provided the model is
properly specified.
Table I also shows that payments in kind (dependent health
care, educational opportunity, pay plus benefits) receive
relatively low rankings in the 0-7 years of service range.
When viewed in the context of utility maximization, the fact
that payments in kind are ranked far below cash payments is
logical. Since payments in kind are non-transferable, they
are discounted below their true market value, i.e., $300 in
housing is worth less to an individual than $300 in cash
16

because the cash has greater utility. This fact would support
the earlier statement regarding the comparability of PVM for
the two officers A and B. Since payments in kind are generally
ranked toward the bottom of the scale, PVM for A should not be
significantly different from that for B, even if A placed a
somewhat greater value on such payments. Furthermore, it can
be argued that junior officers, because of their relatively
good health, small family size, and less restricted lifestyles,
tend to underestimate the value of fringe benefits, military
or civilian.
C. PRESENT VALUE ESTIMATION
Let P. be the annual pay (basic pay plus allowances) of a
lieutenant who begins year j, j = 1969 ,..., 1978 , with exactly
four years of service. Let b. be the value of the benefits
J
received by the lieutenant in year j . Define w . as the annual
wage (annual pay plus benefits) that the lieutenant receives
during the fifth year of service so that




If b. can be expressed as some constant percentage, p (p > 0)
,
of pay then
It can be argued that the tax savings realized on allowances
should be included in P.; its exclusion will be addressed later.
3
The rationale behind the selection of the four year point in a
given lieutenant's career will also be addressed later.
17

w. = (1 + p) P .
D D
Since military pay scales are structured by years of service
and rank, the officer's annual military wage, wm(t) , in some





wm(t) = w. sm(t)
= (1 + p) P. sm(t) j - 1969,..., 1978
t = 0, . .
.
, T
where sm(t) is a step function. Consequently, the present
value of all future compensation realized by a lieutenant who
enters year j with four years of service, PVM
.
, may be obtained
by summing his discounted annual wage,
-prr—yt over all t. Thus,





where r is the discount rate. Now, consider the civilian
alternative occupation. Let W. . be the entrance wage for
occupation i, i = 1,..., n, in year j, and let w. be the median
wage of some occupational cross-section in year j . Suppose
that the supply and demand for entrants into occupation i
does not change with respect to that for the other occupations
that make up the cross-section, so that for any entrance year j,
W. . = c . w
.




t = 0,..., T, be the wage growth rate for occupation i. Then
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the wage for i at some future time t, wc
.
(t) , is given by the
entrance wage times the wage growth rate evaluated at t, or,
wc. (t) = W. . sc. (t)
= c . w . sc . (t)131
Since all officers leaving the service do not select the same
civilian occupation, it is necessary to generalize c. across
all occupations. For want of a better method, assume the
existence of a "typical" constant, c, and a typical wage
growth rate, sc(t), so that
T —
c w . sc (t)




is the present value of the discounted future compensation for
a typical civilian alternative, given entrance in year j.
Now, define
y (1+p) P. sm(t)
PVM . 2-
WR - —1 - t=0 < 1+r^ (3)
j PVC Tew. sc(t) ^ '
: E ]
t=0 (l+r) t
as the present value ratio for a typical lieutenant who enters
year j with four years of service.
Concerning the right hand side of equation (3) , P. and w
.
,
alone, vary over j, j = 1969,..., 1978, providing the military
and civilian wage growth rates and the discount rate remain
constant during the period of interest. Consequently, WR
.
might be considered to be a function of P. and w. . Therefore,
one might expect that PVM. is correlated with P. and PVC. is
19

correlated with w.. The significance of such a correlation
will become apparent in the next section.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Gray [5], Fisher [6], Nelson [7], and Wilburn [8] have all
proposed models for enlisted first-term retention of the form
PVM
where R is the retention rate. Specifically, Fisher concluded
that the appropriate model was
PVM
R = a + 3 ln(p~) + e (4)
where e is a normally distributed error term. Nelson proposed
PVM
ln(R) = a + 6 ln(|^) + Z + e (5)
where Z is an additional set of variables used to stratify a
mixed group of enlisted personnel (e.g., separate ET's from
BT's). The choice of the set Z, therefore, depends on the
degree of aggregation desired in defining a particular group
of enlisted personnel. Gray and Wilburn chose to use a logit
transformation to express the estimate in "odds" form rather
than as a straight probability; hence, the following model:
ln(I?R )
= a + 3 ln(lvl ) + Z + £ (6)
Altergott [4] attempted to modify the above models in order
to allow for his supposition that a given individual might
place a higher value on a change in, say, PVC than he would in
20

an identical change in PVM; thus, he would not value the dollars
in PVM and PVC in a constant ratio. Consequently, Altergott




where d is a constant.
It should be noted that all of the models listed above were
designed for use in enlisted communities, communities where the
military skill of the serviceman is often directly related to
a similar civilian skill. Consequently, the determination of
PVC is somewhat easier and more correct than the procedure
previously proposed for estimating an officer's PVC. In fact,
due to the problems associated with computing PVM and PVC,
an attempt will be made to introduce instrumental variables
in place of PVC and PVM.
Consider a linear least-squares model of the form:
Y. = a + 6 X. + e (8)11
where X. is measured with error v.. The observed value of the
l i
i
control variable is X. = X. + v.. Because of the measurementill
error, the actual regression would be
Y. = a + 3 X. + (e . - 6 v.
)
= a 3 X. + e .
l i
instead of the desired equation (8). Since the control variable
is correlated with the error term, the least squares estimates
of the regression parameters will be biased and inconsistent.
21

The method of instrumental variables [11] specifies substituting
a new control variable V. which is both highly correlated with
the independent variable and uncorrelated with the error term.
Consequently, the use of such an instrument gives consistent
estimates for the regression parameters.
Equations (1) and (2) suggest that P. and w. are candidate
instruments for PVM and PVC , respectively. The models postulated
in equations (4) through (6) will be modified to accommodate the
instruments for PVM and PVC in the applications chapter of this
study. Also, other possible models will be developed and compared
for goodness of fit. First, however, some additional analysis
of the candidate instruments is in order. <
E. P. AND w., 1967 TO 1978
: 3
Consider the military pay structure. Military pay is divided
into three basic categories: basic pay, allowances, and special
pay. Rates of basic pay, the primary means of compensating
members of the uniformed services, are legislated by Congress
and are dependent on both pay grade (rank) and total years of
service. Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Basic Allowance
for Subsistence (BAS) are also legislated, but eligibility is
somewhat more complicated. All officers draw the same BAS,
regardless of rank; however, BAQ rates depend on rank, whether
an officer has dependents, whether government quarters are
utilized, and, in the case of single officers, type of duty.
Special pay, such as submarine duty pay, aviation career
22

incentive pay, and diving pay, depends on rank and/or years of
service and type of duty; special pay does not, in general,
apply to surface warfare officers.
By virtue of their categorization as allowances, BAS and
BAQ are not taxable as personal income; consequently, the
officer drawing such allowances realizes a certain tax advan-
tage. That tax advantage is added to basic pay, BAS, and BAQ,
and the total is termed Regular Military Compensation (RMC)
.
RMC is then used as a benchmark by which to measure the true
cash compensation of servicemen.
Since BAQ rates vary by dependency status and type of duty
as well as rank, the actual RMC realized by officers of
equivalent rank and years of service varies significantly.
Consider the 1976 pay of three lieutenants with more than four
years of service, none of whom utilized government quarters:
one (A) married and serving at sea; one (B) single, without
dependents, serving ashore; and one (C) single, without de-
pendents, serving at sea. Each lieutenant received $14,090.40
in basic pay and $644.28 in BAS. However, A received an
additional $2,677.50 in BAQ, B received $2,169.90, and C
received no BAQ. Table II shows the tax savings realized by
each officer and his RMC, based on 1976 federal income tax















Moreover, since federal income tax rates are graduated by taxa-
ble income levels, the existence of other types of deductions
(interest expense or property taxes) would cause increased vari-
ations in RMC. Finally, variations in income tax rates among
the states would also increase the variations in RMC.
Unless one is able to categorize the officers who left or
remained in the service by actual RMC, the variations in RMC
according to dependency status and type of duty complicate any
attempt to formulate an econometric model for retention, given
cash compensation as an instrument for PVM. Unfortunately,
such a categorization is not feasible with the data available,
and some figure representative of the officer group as a whole
must be chosen. This study will assume that the basic pay plus
BAS plus BAQ for a lieutenant with dependents and more than
four years of service is representative of the RMC of a typical
officer, and this figure will be used for P..
The problems associated with computing PVC for a diverse
officer community have been previously discussed; the problem
of selecting a suitable cross-section to obtain a value for
w. is also difficult. The availability of income statistics
24

for the type of alternative white collar occupations that a
naval officer might select is inadequate for the 1969-78 time
frame. The median annual income of white families, possibly
multiplied by a constant, will be used to represent w. for the
period, the selection of this level of income being made as
much of necessity as of choice.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of P. and w.,
j = 1967,..., 1978. Here both P. and w. have been adjusted to
constant 1976 dollars using the consumer price index for urban
wage earners and clerical workers. Appendix C gives the same
information in tabular form.
With the introduction of the all volunteer force concept,
military pay was raised "to reasonably competitive levels for
the first time in recent history" according to a report sub-
mitted to Congress in compliance with 37 USC 1008 (a) on the
adequacy of military pay and allowances [2]; hence, the greatest
difference between P. and w. occurred during 1972 (P irv _„ =
j 3
3 1972
1.23 w,..,). However, by 1978 the differential had been
reduced by approximately 65%, perhaps due to the fact that
military wage adjustments for the effects of inflation were
somewhat less than those for the civilian wage earners.
Now, consider the effects of the variation of the wage
P.
1
ratio, w. from 1967 to 1978 (Figure 2) . Between 1967 and
1972, that ratio first declined until 1970 when it began a
steep climb, peaking at 1.23 in 1972. However, after 1972,
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Figure 2 . w . vs j
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1978, all of the real military pay gains of the early seventies
had been absorbed by inflation, and the economic position of a
lieutenant in 1978 was no better than that of a lieutenant in
1968-69. In fact, in 1978, an 0-4 (over 10) received about the
same real pay as did an 0-3 (over 4) in 1972; consequently, real





During the period 1969 to 1978, a number of significant
events occurred which directly or indirectly affected naval
officers; here, these will be called environmental factors.
First, the number of surface ships (less mine warfare)
declined from 703 in 1969 to 314 in 1978. Second, the naval
involvement in the Vietnam conflict peaked in 197 2 and then
declined until the evacuation in 1975 ended the Navy's role.
Third, military conscription ended in 1972 with the shift to
an all volunteer force. Each of these events could have some
effect on an individual's decision to enter the Navy or to
pursue a naval career; consequently, in using officer reten-
tion data for the period, some allowance should be made for
the effects of such events, or some assumptions regarding the
net effect of the events must be postulated. This chapter will
examine the retention data in light of these events and develop
heuristic arguments for any necessary adjustments to the data
base. Before beginning that examination, some preliminaries
are necessary.
For the purposes of this study, the following assumptions
are made concerning the attrition categories of Appendix A:
1. Only USN officers resign from the service.
2. Only USNR officers are released from active duty (RAD)
.
3. Both USN and USNR officers may be lost via any one of
the remaining five attrition categories.
29

Regarding the initial obligated service (IOS) requirements
of USN and USNR officers, assume:
1. USN officers enter with four years IOS.
2. USNR officers enter with three years IOS.
Differences exist in the way enlisted servicemen and offi-
cers extend their length of service beyond their IOS; conse-
quently, additional clarification regarding officer retention
is required. Enlisted personnel and USNR officers must initi-
ate action (reenlistment for enlisted, extension of obligated
service for USNR officers) to remain beyond their IOS. USN
officers, however, serve until they initiate action (resigna-
tion) to leave. Thus, enlisted personnel and USNR officers
essentially renew their contracts with the Navy for a particu-
lar length of time while USN officers may resign at any time
beyond the end of their obligated service. In applying the
"first term" retention models to the case of officers, a
definition of "first term" retention is necessary.
The data in Appendix A show that, of those USN officers
who left the service before completing their tenth year, a
majority left before beginning their seventh year of service.
This study will, therefore, be concerned with the retention
of USN officers with six or fewer years of service and USNR
officers with five or fewer years of service. Consider such
retention to be "first term."
The IOS requirement for USNA entrants changed from 4 to
5 years beginning with the USNA Class of 1969. The net effect




The most important environmental change affecting the surface
warfare community during the 1970' s was the drastic reduction in
the number of surface units. Figure 3 illustrates the reduction.
The reduction was brought about by the desire of the Navy to cut
operating expenses in order to have the necessary funds avail-
7
able for fleet modernization. Such a reduction in ships left
the Navy with a surplus of surface warfare officers; and, since
junior USNR officers are the easiest to eliminate, the USNR
segment of the surface warfare community experienced heavy
losses, particularly during the FY69-73 period when 285 of the
g
eventual 389 ships were retired. Thus, during the early part
of the seventies, many USNR officers with 2, 3 , 4 or 5 years
of service v/ere forced into the civilian community and their
decision regarding a naval career was somewhat moot.
The decisions of USN officers regarding continuing in the
service were affected in more subtle ways. Ship retirements
reduced sea tour opportunities (or, conversely, increased
shore duty opportunities) for USN officers so that the overall
effect on a given USN officer would depend on the relative
values he placed on sea duty and shore duty. During the same
period increased emphasis was placed on officer subspecialties
7One might say that a reduction in operating budget rather
than fleet size was the most important factor; however, the
effect was the same.
o













Figure 3: Numbers of Commissioned Surface Ships (1968-1978)
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and less traditional avenues of advancement; thus, the amount
of sea duty necessary for advancement also declined. The intro-
duction of a number of new surface units, notably the FF-1052
class, and the retirement of many of the aged fleet units
tended to increase the overall quality of sea duty while the
quantity declined. Finally, since USN officers were not forced
to resign, the USN officer was still able to choose to continue;
such was not the case for many USNR officers.
Another environmental factor was the end of the draft in
1972. Without doubt, many of the USNR officers, if not most,
who entered naval service prior to 1973 did so to avoid being
conscripted into the Army and had no intention of serving beyond
their IOS. While some came to thrive in the Navy and developed
career intentions, the majority probably never seriously con-
sidered a military career. On the other hand, USN entrants
prior to 1973 should have been at least partially motivated
toward a career, given that there were easier and quicker ways
to fulfill their military service obligations. Moreover, due
to the length of the pipeline for USN entrants (4 years for
NROTC and USNA graduates) , any effect on USN retention from the
draft's end would not be realized until 1980 (1972 plus four
years pipeline plus four years IOS) . USNR officer retention
would have been effected as early as late 1975 since all USNR
entrants after 1972 were joining the Navy rather than avoiding
the Army.
The ordinary least squares models of this study require,
among other things, a normally distributed error term with
zero mean and constant variance. While it is doubtful that
33

the environmental changes of the seventies had a serious effect
on the USN data, it is obvious that the effect on USNR officers
was considerable and that the USNR data is not readily usable.
Almost certainly, USNR officers were so influenced by the
changing environment that the continuation decision of a USNR
officer in, say, 1973 bore little relation to that of a similar
officer in 1978. Consequently, an error term with constant
variance is highly improbable for a regression based on the
USNR data available. Since no suitable method of adjusting
the USNR data to eliminate the environmental effects could be
devised, the remainder of this study will concentrate on USN
surface warfare officer retention, alone.
C. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE DATA
A perusal of Appendices A and B will demonstrate several
deficiencies in the data.
First, it can be verified that the various officer attrition
categories and the list of accessions do not fully account for
all officer losses and gains. For example, Appendix A lists
a beginning strength of 648 USN (REG) officers with YS = 4 in
1970. For that same year, 158 officers are shown to have
resigned their commissions. Barring a loss of any USN officers
from the remaining six possible attrition categories, one
would expect 648-158, or 490, USN officers with YS = 5 to
begin 1971. However, Appendix A shows 534 USN officers with
YS = 5 began 1971. Some regular officers could have been gained
from other communities; however, Appendix B lists only 11 officers
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(USN and/or USNR) as accessions. Even if one assumes that all
accessions were USN, 534 - (490+11), or 33, of the officers
gained are unaccounted for. It is also possible that some of
the USNR officers augmented to USN during 1970; however, only
4 of the USNR officers (195 USNR with YS = 4 in 1970 minus 35
RAD implies 160 USNR officers should begin 1971 versus the 156
shown by Appendix A) could have contributed to the 19 71 USN
total with YS = 5. Also, it should be noted that another 7
officers (USN and/or USNR) with YS = 4 were lost through the
other attrition categories so that the USN discrepancy might
be as high as 51.
Second, Appendix B shows extremely high numbers of accessions
during 1975 of officers with 1, 2, 3 and 4 years of service.
The most reasonable explanation for these abnormal accessions
is that some of the accessions are actually "inventory" gams
due to an earlier classification error, i.e., some surface
warfare officers were actually placed in the wrong community
in earlier years and the mistake corrected in 1975. No matter
what the reason for the abnormal accessions, the net effect is
to bloat the USN officer bases for 1976 and 1977 and, probably,
to bias the retention rate upward.
Third, between FY76 and FY77, a temporary fiscal year was
added, FY7T. This three month addition was implemented to allow
the military to shift from a July-July fiscal year to an October-
October fiscal year. Here, data for FY7T will be combined with





Finally, surface warfare officers did not exist as a community
separate from other 11XX officers prior to 1972. With the
creation of a separate community for surface warfare, it was
necessary to alter the data base prior to 1972 to reflect what
was later to become that community. Consequently, some errors
may have been introduced at the time the pre-1972 data was
updated.
These four data deficiencies require a careful construction
of the retention or loss rate figures to be used in the regres-
sion analysis. In particular, the first deficiency requires
one to choose between accepting the numbers of resignations
listed or computing some net resignation figure. The second
option will be taken; precisely, the overall officer net loss
figure will be used for USN officers. That net loss figure
will be determined in the following manner:
Let S. . be the beginning strength of USN officers with YS =
i in year j. Let LN . . be the net loss of USN officers with
YS = i during year j. Then,
LN . . = S . . - S , .
L
, w . L , , i = 4, 5ID 1: (.1+1) (D+l)
j = 1970, . . . , 1977
Also, define LN . as the net number of USN officers lost during
the fifth and sixth year of service, given j as the year in
which the fifth year of service was entered (i.e., LN . is the
net "first-term" loss) . Thus,
LN. = S . . - S,,.,-. j = 1970,..., 1976
J 4d 6(3+2) J
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Table III list S .
.
, S-. , S, . , LN .
.
, LN C . , and LN . for the4j 5j 6j 4] 53 ]
period of interest.
Net retention rates for USN surface warfare officers can
be computed directly from Table III. Define R . as the net
retention of USN surface warfare officers who enter year j with
YS = 4 (group SW4) and R,. . as the net retention of USN surface
warfare officers who enter year j with YS = 5 (group SW5)
.
Also, define R. as the net "first term" retention of USN
3
surface warfare officers during their fourth through fifth
year of service (group SW4,5)
,
given YS = 4 in year j.
Thus,
S . - LN .
RA+
=
~q — j = 1970,..., 19784: b
4j
S, • - LN,. .
R . = -^ ^i j = 1970,..., 1978
S . - LN .
R. = —^5 1 j = 1970,..., 1977
3 S 4j
Figure 4 illustrates R.
.












1970 648 481 451 114 43 224
1971 528 534 438 83 110 97
1972 540 445 424 5 14 13
1973 668 535 431 31 8 105
1974 795 637 527 102 74 214
1975 696 693 563 * 112 *
1976 795 736 581 * 191 *
1977 809 819 545 140 195 339
1978 786 669 624 112 199 -
1979 964 674 470 _ _ _
LN
*Because of the abnormal accessions in 1975, LN . ,, q7C-. and










Recall the classical, normal linear least squares model of
a time series relationship:
Y
t
= a + B Xt +
e
t
Apart from the implicit assumption that Y is linear in X
,
certain other assumptions apply, including:
1. Normality: The dependent variable is assumed to be
normally distributed.
2. Independence: For any two observations on the dependent
variable, say Y, and Y. , (k ^ 0) , Y is assumed to be independent
of Y
t+k"
3. Homoscedasticity : The dependent variable observations
2
are assumed to have the same variance, y .
Under these assumptions the Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE;
2
Y
of a, $, and v can be shown [9] to be given by
a = Y - e X (9)
(10)
Z X. Y. - N X Y
- t t t2—2







t " ^ " S V" (11)
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Furthermore, it can also be shown [9] that these maximum likeli-
hood estimators for a (a) and 3 (3) are normally distributed:
2 2
Y s x
a ~ Normal (a, -^—^—
-_
_) (13)





3 ~ Normal (3, =r7) (13)
E (X. - Xp
t fc
Knowledge of the distribution of the estimators permits the
construction of t-statistics which may be used to test the sig-
nificance of the parameter estimates [9].
Apart from testing the significance of the regression co-
efficients, themselves, two additional statistics are usually
specified for use in evaluating the goodness of fit of the
2
overall regression model. The first, statistic, R , is the
proportion of the variation among the observed values of the
dependent variable that is explained by the regression model;
the second statistic, an F-statistic, can be used to test the
2 9
significance of the R statistic. Equations (14) and (15)
2
are the defining relationships for the R and F statistics,
respectively; these equations are presented without elaboration.10
9Actually, the F-statistic tests the null hypothesis,
H_ : a = and 3=0.
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R N - k
Vi, N-k
± _ R
2 k - 1
Where: e=Y-a-0X
k = number of control variables plus 1
N = number of observations
In the case of time series models such as those of interest
in this study, heteroscedasticity is unusual because changes in
the dependent variable and a change in the control variable are
likely to be of a similar order of magnitude. Moreover, given
the small number of observations available, heteroscedasticity,
if present, would be difficult to detect. Here, unless an
examination of the residuals shows a marked pattern of increas-
ing or decreasing magnitudes over the period of the observations,
homoscedasticity will be accepted.
Time series, however, are very susceptible to the effects
of serial correlation; and, since serial correlation would vio-
late the assumption of independence, the absence of serial
correlation must be verified or the model modified to negate
its effect. The Durbin-Watson Test [10] will be used to detect
the presence of serial correlation. That test specifies the
use of a test statistic, DW, which is based on the residuals
from the ordinary least squares regression procedure. The
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Durbin-Watson statistic is defined:






Unfortunately, tables for the Durbin-Watson test are not
available for regressions based on fewer than 15 observations
so that a straight- forward application of the statistic is not
possible for the regressions used in this study. Pindyck and
Rubinfeld [ll] have shown that, after several simple approxi-
mations, the test statistic is approximately equal to 2(1 - p)
,
A.
where p is the estimate for the correlation between Y and Y ,
,
Consequently, an approximation for the correlation coefficient
can be obtained:
J
p « 1 -
™ (17)
Since -l^_p£ 1, equation (17) indicates a Durbin-Watson of 2
would imply the absence of serial correlation.
Given p from equation (17) as a departure point, the
Hildreth-Lu Procedure [12] may be used to determine how the
total sum of the squares of the residuals varies with p ; hence,
the overall effect of the presence of serial correlation, if










+ (^ t~P^ t _ ± ) (18)
for a set of grid values around p and selecting the grid value
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which gives the smallest residual sum of squares as the best
estimator for p . Although the above procedure does not give
firm statistical results, its use will allow an evaluation of
the effect of any serial correlation, and, hence, an evaluation
of the appropriateness of the independence assumption.
B. LINEARITY
Each of the models previously discussed (equations (4), (5),
and (6)) specify that the dependent variable be linear in a
single independent variable. For ease of presentation and
analysis, the proposed instruments for PVM. (P.) and PVC . (w.)
will be incorporated into the models and the models will be
labeled Ml, M2 , and M3 . Specifically, denote:
P .
Ml: R. = a + 3 In (=1) + e. Jbultc^.
J w -; D
3
_z






M3: ln(, 3__) = a + 3 In (=1) + e.
1 - R. W . ]
For reasons that will become apparent, a fourth model, M4 , will
be considered; denote:
R.
M4: R. =a + 3=2-+e.
D Wj ]
Before continuing to the actual statistical analysis of
these four models, a preliminary evaluation of the appropriate-
ness of the linearity assumption may be made by plotting the
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dependent variable for each model against its independent
variable. Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 illustrate such plots for Ml,
M2 , M3 and M4 , respectively, using fifth year retention data
points (i.e., R,. . for group SW5) for the period.
Although not shown, identical plots using fourth year
retention data points (R. . for group SW4) and overall "first
term" data (R. for group SW4,5) give similar results, except
plots based on the Ml relationship do not support linearity.
Consequently, Ml will be eliminated from further consideration
in favor of M2 , M3 and M4
.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Linear least squares regressions were performed using models
M2 , M3 and M4 on net retention data for regular surface warfare
officers with four but less than five years of service (group SW4)
,
five but less than six years of service (group SW5) , and four
but less than six years of service (group SW4,5). The regression
results and appropriate statistics are reported in Table IV.
Consider those statistics.
Reference to a table of the standard t-distribution verifies
that t >_ 2.571 specifies rejecting the two-tailed null hypothesis
(H : a = 0) at the 0.05 level of significance with N = 6, and
t
B
>_ 2.571 specifies rejecting the two-tailed null hypothesis
(H : 3=0) at the 0.05 significance level with N = 6. Conse-
quently, a reported t-statistic >_ 2.571 for both a and 3 would














































































Figure 7: InU ^2—
)
vs In (=2-) (MODEL M3) .



































Table TV: Regression Results
rH St CO LO LO rH
CD St CM CM F- St r- CD m















































































































































































































CM CO St CM CO

















A table of the 0.95 quantile of the F distribution specifies
rejecting the null hypothesis (H Q : a = and 3=0) if Fm n >_ 6.61
when m = 1 and n = 5. Thus, a reported F-statistic greater than
6.61 also supports a given model.
It should be noted that, while the R statistic may be compared
directly from one model to the next, the standard error (SE) is
not directly comparable because of the different transformations
applied to the dependent variables in each of the three models
under consideration.
While reported Durbin-Watson statistics are not directly usable
for reasons previously discussed, those statistics indicate, and
separate Hildreth-Lu procedures support, independence between the
j and j-1 observations on the dependent variable.
A group by group and model by model comparison of the statis-
tical results indicates that M2 is superior to M4 and that M3 is
clearly inferior to either M2 or M4 . Also, comparing across
groups, it will be noted that for each model, the SW4 group gives
the poorest fit and the SW4 , 5 group gives the best fit. The
marked difference across the groups warrants further explanation.
It was previously noted (Data Analysis, Section A) that the
IOS requirement for USNA entrants changed from four to five
years after the USNA class of 1968. Consequently, after 1972,
the USNA officers with YS = 4 who desired separation from the
service had to wait an additional year. The net effect of such
a change in IOS would be to increase the retention rate for the
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SW4 group and decrease the rate for the SW5 group. A review
of Figure 4 will illustrate this point. Thus, while it is
felt that the SW4 , 5 and SW5 groups 1 retention data are not
seriously affected by such a change in the USNA entrants' IOS
,
the SW4 group data are probably biased. That bias partially
explains the poor fit for the SW4 group.
It is not the intent of this study to go beyond a retention
model for "first term" surface warfare officers; however,
additional retention data for all unrestricted line (URL)
officers was obtained from OP130 for comparison purposes.
Although the URL data is not identical in format and category
to that of the surface warfare community since it includes non-
due course officers, it is believed that some additional insight
into the legitimacy of the three models, M2 , M3 , and M4 , can be
gained by performing regressions using those models on the URL
data. The URL data was adjusted to net retention data using
the same procedure as that for the surface warfare data before
applying the regressions. The statistical results of the
regressions are presented in Appendix D. It should be noted
P .
-1
that since —- does not include the special pay categories applica-
ble to some URL officers, the use of P. and w. as instruments
3 3
for PVM. and PVC , respectively, probably increases the amount
of— unexplained variability.
In the regressions performed on the SW5 group, the problem
posed by such a change in IOS was partially corrected by perform-
ing the regressions without the first two data points. Such an




Define the elasticity of retention with respect to wage
AR
ratio as the proportional change in retention, -=-, divided byR
the proportional change in wage ratio, — -. Let E denote
that elasticity so that:
f - AR / R (1 q)E
R " A(wr) / wr 9
In derivative form, (19) may be reexpressed:
_
dR / R dR wr ,_ .
^R d(wr) / wr d(wr) R K u>
Removing the logarithmic transformation, M2 , the best fitting
model, may be written:
R = ea wr 3 (21)
Implicit differentiation of (21) yields:
dR = 3 ea wr3-1 d(wr) (22)
or,
dR Q a B-l (23)= 3 e wrd(wr)
Substituting (23) into (20) gives an expression for E based
on M2
o c 3 a a
ER = ^-R^- = ^ SB (24)
Actually, wr. = — . The subscripts have been suppressed
1 w
.
for ease of presentation.
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ER - B ¥ (">
wr
Thus, ED based on M4 varies as the ratio -5- so that E is greater




Table V gives values of E utilizing parameter estimates
developed in the preceding section for models M2 and M4 and
groups SW4 , SW5 , and SW4,5.
TABLE V
Elasticity of Retention, E_





SW4, 5 M2 5.382




A. POLICY APPLICATIONS OF THE RETENTION MODEL
Even though uncertainties exist regarding the accuracy of
the data and the development of the models utilized, a relation-
ship between the retention of junior surface warfare officers
and their relative compensation level is apparent. The 1976
Defense Manpower Commission's [l] supposition that "...one
serves regardless of recognition or appreciation," while perhaps
true in former times, is no longer valid. The statement of the
1978 Commission on Military Compensation [2] that "...the Nation's
supply of military manpower has become more dependent on the
I
conditions of the labor marketplace" is supported by the results
of this study.
The existence of a quantifiable relationship between reten-
tion and relative compensation level facilitates the analysis
of the effect of various compensation policy alternatives vis
a vis a desired retention level. For purposes of illustration,
suppose that a 5.5% military cost of living pay adjustment is
proposed to compensate for a 10.5% annual inflation rate.
Assume that the current annual retention rate of fifth year
surface warfare officers (group SW5) is 0.7 and the current
wage ratio is 1.09. Utilizing the elasticity of retention













If the private sector also grants a 5.5% cost of living adjust-
ment so that the median income level of white families (in current
dollars) also changes by 5.5%, then A (wr) = and AR = 0, i.e.,
retention rate remains unchanged.
However, if private sector productivity or worker bargaining
power produces a greater than 5.5% pay adjustment, one would
expect retention to decrease. Assume that the median income
level matches the rate of inflation so that w,..,. = w. + 0.105 w.(3+D 3 3
and A(wr) = -.049. Then,







predicted retention (R,.,,. = R. + AR) is 0.616r (3 + 1) 3Thus
B. MINIMIZING PERSONNEL COSTS
Given the current military pay structure, a raise in pay
for junior officers results in a similar raise for the more
senior ranks. Since cash compensation appears less important
above the seventh year point in an officer's career, such a
raise for the more senior officers might appear excessive.
However, the regressions utilized in this study require that
the military pay growth rate remain constant in order for the
individual contemplating a career to estimate PVM. The effect
on retention of altering the military pay growth rate to reduce
the rate in the more senior ranks cannot be readily determined.
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The results of this study suggest that to improve junior
officer retention one must incur higher personnel costs in all
ranks
.
On the other hand, the failure to adequately compensate
the junior ranks results in low retention and high replacement
costs at the ensign level. Furthermore, if one accepts the
premise that those officers with the greatest military poten-
tial generally possess the greatest civilian potential, the
present value ratio, PVM/PVC, of the better officers is some-
what lower than that of a "typical" officer. Thus, a decrease
in the present value ratio should result in a "quality" loss
as well as a numeric loss.
Viewed in the larger context of total personnel costs, the rele-
vant problem involves trade-offs between retention costs and
replacement costs. The solution to such a problem requires the
construction of a model which balances billet costs against
acquisition costs in order to determine the retention vector
that minimizes total personnel costs. The retention models
developed in this study relate compensation levels to retention
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67 15739 14039 1700 1.121
68 16002 14623 1379 1.094
69 16362 15208 1154 1.076
70 17231 15006 2225 1.148
71 17871 15001 2370 1.191
72 19374 15715 3659 1.233
73 19485 16134 3351 1.208
74 18163 15478 2585 1.173
75 17548 15091 2457 1.153
76 17412 15537 1875 1.121
77 17274 15560"" 1714 1.110
78 17110 15700 1410 1.090
13 From The Economic Report of the President, January 1978.
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